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AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO 
ABSTRACT 
Parliamentary versus Presidential Political System:  Options for post January 
2011 Egypt  
 
By Ashraf Hamdy 
The debate on the merits of the parliamentary system of government versus the 
presidential system has been going on for many years now. Recently the topic 
attracted increased empirical attention with studies that looked at the impact of the 
system of government on different political, economic, and social aspects. This work 
adds to the literature a study that, using a global data set, empirically analyzes the 
effects of the choice of government system on income inequality, the level of political 
freedom, and the level of civil liberties in a society in general with an application to 
Egypt in particular. 
The empirical analysis revealed a strong relationship between parliamentarism as a 
political system and income equality, political rights and civil liberties in a society. 
The parliamentary system of government appears to be advantageous, compared to the 
presidential system, in its effect on the three main aspects under evaluation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On the early morning of Tuesday 25 January 2011, Tahrir Square in central Cairo was 
witnessing an unusual build-up of security forces. The build-up was not in preparation 
for the celebrations by the security forces of their “Police Day” but in anticipation of 
the march that was to take place on that day. A march that was called for by different 
activists groups through web based social media in protest against police brutality and 
human rights abuses by the security forces that were seen to have escalated in recent 
years. A march that, 18 days later, would cause the collapse of the Hosni Mubarak 
regime that ruled Egypt for thirty years. The Egyptian people have finally revolted 
against dictatorship. 
For observers of the Egyptian political scene, several inter-related factors have led to 
this popular uprising, which was sparked by the different youth groups and was 
massively supported by ordinary Egyptians from all social stratifications. Several 
tactical errors on part of the regime have contributed to its astonishing collapse. Those 
factors that resulted in the call for protest have been building-up for years because of 
the poor performance of the Mubarak regime on almost all fronts. They are best 
summarized by the most prevalent slogan that was chanted in the early days by the 
protesters that represented their fundamental demands: dignity, freedom, and social 
justice. 
This slogan, while epitomizing the basic demands of the revolutionaries, reflects on the 
main shortcomings of the Mubarak regime and the outcomes of its policies throughout 
its hegemony over the Egyptian life for three decades. The abuse of basic human rights 
of Egyptians at the hands of the security apparatus under the protection of the 
everlasting state of emergency and under the excuse of protecting the state against acts 
of terrorism; the suppression of political rights and freedom of expression, the 
manipulation of the democratic process to paint a façade of democracy while 
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maintaining the hegemony of the ruling party; the steady deterioration of all aspects of 
public service; the spread of corruption to endemic proportions; and finally the 
deterioration in the standards of living of ordinary Egyptians and the stark inequality in 
income distribution are all but the underpinnings of the inevitable change.  
The success of the people’s revolution in Egypt in peacefully forcing President 
Mubarak out of office on 11 February 2011 initiated movement on two tracks: the 
process of dealing with the past in terms of investigating and prosecuting the pillars of 
the fallen regime for alleged crimes of corruption and abuse of authority on one hand, 
and the process of reshaping the political landscape and the economic and social future 
of Egypt on the other.  
The latter process is the concern of this work. More specifically, the institutional design 
of the political system to be adopted in the new constitution and its effects on the extent 
of success in achieving the goals of January the 25
th
 revolution, namely dignity, 
freedom and social justice. Dignity as represented by the respect of human rights of the 
Egyptian people. Freedom as represented by the basic freedoms of belief expression, 
assembly and affiliation. Social Justice as represented by alleviation of poverty and 
income disparity, control of corruption and extension of social welfare. 
The process of reshaping the Egyptian political arena was initiated by the constitutional 
declaration that was announced by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) 
who are in charge of the country during the interim period. This period which started by 
Mr. Mubarak relinquishing his position, will end with the election of a new president 
and a new parliament who are to form a constituent assembly with the mandate of 
drafting a new constitution for the republic within six months of its appointment. 
Simultaneously, and without delay, scholars, political pundits, analysts and writers 
embarked on a new and fresh debate for the first time in as many as six decades. Should 
we abolish the presidential system in favor of the parliamentary system?  Which system 
is better suited for the accomplishment of the aspiration of the revolution? Which 
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system is more likely to result in the consolidation of the new democracy that the 
people are set to establish? Which system will prevent the re-emergence of autocracy? 
Which system will not bring back a new Pharaoh? The answer to those questions is the 
general object of this work. The choice between the presidential or the parliamentary 
system of government, the advantage of one system over the other in terms of 
addressing the specific demands of the Egyptian revolution: dignity, freedom, and 
social justice are the main themes of inquiry that this work is set to explore. 
Egypt has been adopting a semi-presidential system of government, since the 1952 
revolution by the Free Officers, which is similar to the French system at least in form. 
Reality of government is, however, different since Egypt polity is not regarded as a 
democracy, even during the later years of the Mubarak regime with all the elections and 
the opposition parties and opposition press which provided a façade of democracy. 
Before July 1952, Egypt was a parliamentary monarchy. This fact contributed to the 
discourse about the advantages and disadvantages of the different systems. Many 
believe that the parliamentary system is too cumbersome and requires and advanced 
and mature state of democratization that is far from obvious in present day Egypt. 
Others contend that this system, the parliamentary, is not foreign to the Egyptian polity, 
they claim that in fact it was the system that prevailed during the most democratic times 
that Egypt has experienced during its political history,  namely in the period between 
the two world wars. 
Opponents of the parliamentary system of government argue that at this transitional 
stage Egypt needs a strong executive capable of leading the country through the turmoil 
of transition from autocracy to democracy and emphasize the need to attain a maximum 
level of separation of powers that is embodied by the presidential system. On the other 
hand, parliamentarists argue back that the presidential or the semi-presidential system 
that was adopted in Egypt since 1952 contributed directly to the unchecked hegemony 
by the president on all aspects of government including the legislature and the 
judiciary. A fact that many believe was the ultimate cause of all the ailments of 
government that plagued the political, economic and social life of the Egyptians for six 
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decades. Both side of the debate have convincing arguments and show equal conviction 
to their views. An analysis that studies the available theoretical and empirical 
contribution of scholarship on the issue and links it all to the Egyptian conditions and 
the goals set by the revolution and aspired to by the Egyptian people. It is that analysis 
that this work intends to furnish. A review of the available literature on the topic 
followed by an empirical analysis of the relationship between parliamentarism and 
dignity, freedom and social justice represented by civil liberties, political freedom and  
income equality. 
 
Research Question 
The purpose of this work is to answer the main question of which system of 
government should Egypt choose at this crossroads instance in its history. Should it 
retain the current presidential system? Alternatively, should it go towards a European 
style parliamentary system? 
This leads to other queries namely: how does the choice of parliamentary or 
presidential systems as the political regime for the country affect income inequality? 
How does the political regime affect the citizens’ exercise of their political rights? 
How does the political regime affect citizens’ civil liberties? 
To answer these questions, we use a multi-variant regression analysis to find the 
relationship between economic inequality, political rights and civil liberties as 
dependant variables and parliamentarism as the main regressor plus a host of control 
variables, which include per capita income, level of illiteracy, political culture and other 
related variables. 
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I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
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C o n c e p t s  
“Democracy is a political regime where the will of the people becomes the law of the 
country.” (Lane & Ersson, 2003, p. 2).  
This is the definition of democracy used for the purpose of this inquiry. As depicted in 
the graphic representation in figure (1), democracy is the intervening and moderating 
political process. For this process to function and produce the expected outcomes in a 
sustained manner, certain inputs are required. Those are represented by the general 
categories of independent variables. The scholarship is rich with studies of the 
independent variables that affect the sustenance and functioning of a democratic 
system. The depicted broad categorization entails most if not all those variables. It is 
important to stress here that direct causality is not to be inferred by the arrows in the 
diagram. The relationship between the independent variables and the measure of 
democracy as a dependant variable is of a complex, associative nature at best in most 
studies.  
The outcomes of a consolidated democratic regime can be regarded as a manifestation 
of the success of a democracy through good governance. Governance is another 
intervening and moderating process that translates the will of the people through the 
laws of the land into the desired outcomes that eventually lead to the desired quality of 
life that the people will. Scholars have studied the effects of the various independent 
variables under the specified categories on governance as a dependant variable, 
yielding interesting results most of which confirm the intuitive speculation that good 
governance is associated with democracy as defined here.  
Governance however, is still a process and is not regarded as a goal in itself.  It is 
through good governance that the desired outcomes of democracy are realized. Such 
outcomes can be represented under the four main groups; the categories of dependant 
variables. Those outcomes under the broad categories are what lead to the quality of life 
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aspirations of the people. It is interesting to note the feedback loop depicted by the 
white arrows going back to the independent variables. The realization that outcomes of 
good governance are themselves inputs to democracy make the assertion that the 
process is a self-reinforcing mechanism an obvious one. 
The purpose of this work is to characterize the relationship between the choices of 
political regime, parliamentary or presidential, which fall under the category of 
independent variables of institutional conditions in the diagram, and the outcomes of 
good governance that best translate the fundamental demands of the Egyptian 
revolution, specifically: civil liberties, political rights and equality. Those outcomes fall 
under the main categories of economic development, political development and human 
development. Specific variables represented by published indices are used and are 
discussed in more detail in the methodology section of this document. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature is abundant with theoretical debate over the merits of parliamentarism 
versus presidentialism as a constitutional arrangement or aspect of institutional design 
for transitioning countries. Such debate has lasted for a long time despite the observed 
differences in outcomes of the two systems and their effects on governance in general 
and policy making in particular. Scholars and political scientists in Europe and America 
as early Woodrow Wilson and Walter Bagehot have deliberated over the impact of the 
consolidation or separation of power as the main characteristic of the form of 
government on elections and campaigns, on parties’ behavior, on the courts and the 
bureaucracies (Lijphart, 1992; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Skach 2005). In recent 
years however, several studies have been conducted on the practical effects of 
constitutional arrangements on different variables that cover areas of human 
development, political development and economic development in societies. The issues 
range from the impact of parliamentarism on agricultural policies to its effects on the 
environment and passing through several other important outputs of public policy in 
between. The said studies utilized cross-national and panel data over time to delineate 
the effects of parliamentarism on the different dependant variables mentioned, some 
drawing a causal relationship and others simply indicating association.  The literature 
on the subject can be divided into two main categories: theoretical debate and empirical 
analysis. The following review is thus adopting a similar division.  
T h e o r e t i c a l  D e b a t e  
While scholars and policy makers agree on the important impact that constitutional 
arrangements, in particular the type of political regime, have on a polity they differ in 
the outcome of adopting one form of government or the other  and the impact that that 
may have on public policymaking (Gerring et al, 2009; Tsebilis, 2000). Such 
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differences can be attributed to the contrasting nature of the two main forms of 
government under study.  
The Presidential System 
The main feature of the presidential system is the direct election of the president by the 
people for a fixed term in office. Different countries have different arrangements for the 
number of bids a president can make for re-election. For example, the USA has a fixed 
four-year term and the president can be elected for one additional term only. Mexico on 
the other hand allows the president to be elected for one term of six years with no 
possibility of re-election. 
Under the presidential system, the bureaucracy is managed by the top executive yet has 
double accountability to the president and to the parliament. 
Another important distinction of the presidential system is the fact that the executive 
cannot be discharged except through impeachment or a revolution perhaps. The 
president, in purely presidential systems is the head of government and the head of the 
state, whereas in semi-presidential systems the prime minister shares the head of 
government position. 
The underlying principle of the presidential system is the separation of powers doctrine. 
The power is shared between the president as the head of the executive branch and the 
parliament as the legislative branch. There are different opinions on the viability of this 
concept. Some scholars (Ackerman, , 2000, Lijphart, 1992, Linz & Valinzuela, 1994) 
believe that the concept of separation of power weakens government, especially in the 
presence of fewer strong parties in parliaments due to double legitimacey and defused 
accountability issues. 
 
The Parliamentary System 
Under the parliamentary system, the people elect their representatives to parliament 
who then form the government. There may be a president or a monarch who is the 
symbol of the state and normally have ceremonial but not government duties. The 
parliament has a dual authority, legislative and executive through the cabinet. 
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The government needs the support of the legislature in the form of a vote of confidence, 
and can be removed from office at any time through the vote of no confidence. The 
bureaucracy is controlled and managed by one coherent entity and does not have a dual 
reporting as the case of the presidential system. The president or the monarch selects a 
prime minister who is entrusted with forming a cabinet from members of the majority 
party or a coalition of parties in the parliament.  
The main underlying principle in a parliamentary system is the concept of fusion of 
power. Contrary to the presidential system where power is diffused between the 
executive branch and the legislature, in the parliamentary system, power is 
concentrated and government is a collegial affair. According to many scholars 
(Horowitz, 1990, Lipset, 1990, Stepan & Skach, 1993) the seperation of powers is an 
essential element in a democracy, providing checks and balances to limit the powers of 
government and protect the rights of the people. 
Based on the above characteristics, each system is expected to react differently and 
have different impact on to the requirements of good governance, prudent 
policymaking, executive powers, party systems, and the consolidation and endurance of 
democracy (Sartori, 1997, Ackerman, 2000). 
The consolidation and the endurance of democracy received the most attention in the 
theoretical debate that went on over the years. Of the many who studied the effects of 
institutional design on the consolidation and endurance of democracies and the merits 
of choosing a particular system over the other is Juan Linz. In his seminal work 
published in 1990 in the Journal of Democracy Linz argued for parliamentarism as 
more conducive to democratic consolidation and endurance than presidentialism 
especially in cases where there is multipartyism and political cleavage (Linz, 1990a; 
Elgie, 2004). This conclusion is based on the view that presidentialism is inherently 
flawed because of its three main features of rigidity, multiple legitimacy, and the zero-
sum nature of its electoral process (Ackerman, 2000; Linz, 1990b).  Rigidity arises 
from the fixed term of the elected president who is elected for a definite term in office 
and cannot be removed except through impeachment. This inflexibility according to 
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Linz can be a threat to the consolidation of the democracy. This is because it does not 
allow for adjustment in course, or changes that may be needed to address emergent 
circumstances especially in the case of the sudden absence or incapacitation of the 
executive leaving someone who may have been elected separately or even appointed by 
the departing president without regard to their ability to govern. 
The second issue with presidentialism is what is known as double legitimacy (Linz, 
1990a; Ackerman, 2000) which refers to the fact that in such systems both the president 
and the legislature are elected separately and normally directly by the people. 
Legitimacy in claimed by both institutions and in the case where the legislature is 
formed by a majority that is opposed to the political orientation of the president conflict 
is likely to arise. Such conflict can lead to policy stalemates and may threaten the 
endurance of the democracy, as was the case with many countries in Latin America in 
the 1970s where because of the impasse the armed forces had to intervene or mediate, 
permanently in some cases, which resulted in the collapse of the democracy (Linz & 
Valinzuela, 1994) 
The third point raised by Linz against presidentialism is its “ zero-sum-game” nature or 
“ winner-takes-all” mentality which results in the exclusion of losers, albeit with a 
narrow margin, from government. In contrast, parliamentary systems, while giving the 
executive role to the wining majority, often include minority parties. This argument is 
furthered by stressing the exclusionary nature of presidentialism and the intolerance of 
elected presidents towards political opposition and, in addition, the fact that 
presidentialism tends to personalize the executive rather than institutionalize it (Linz, 
1990b). 
 
Such arguments against presidentialism and its effects on democratic consolidation and 
stability are shared by many scholars including Fred Riggs who criticized the principle 
of separation of powers being the fundamental feature of the presidential system as 
seriously flawed (Riggs, 1994). This view is also supported by Stephan and Skach 
(1993) and Bruce Ackerman (2000) who was an advocate of parliamentarism and a 
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main opponent of the concept of separation of powers (Ackerman, 2000; Stepan & 
Skach, 1993). 
The preceding arguments were not without criticism however, Arend Lijphart (1992, 
1999) and Donald Horowitz (1990) contented that while parliamentarism was 
empirically observed to lead to less democratic breakdown when compared with 
presidentialism, attributing the higher rate of failure to consolidate to the type of regime 
as a single explanatory variable is misleading in the least. Horowitz and others argued 
that presidentialism was not inherently a weak system in its own right but it is the 
combination with other factors, such as electoral system for example, that yield the 
unfavorable results, a fact the Linz chose to ignore according to Horowitz 
(Horowitz,1990; Lijphart, 1995). This theme of reasoning was further developed by 
others like Matthew Shugart and John Carey (1992) and by Scott Mainwaring (1993). 
In this view, it was necessary to explore the institutional features of regime types in 
connection with issues like electoral systems, party systems and the constitutional 
power of the executive. The subsequent scholarship expanded the list of control 
variables in the study of factors that affect democratic consolidation and endurance to 
include electoral systems, culture, ethnic and religious cleavage, multipartyism, 
democratic history, and the degree of institutionalization to name a few. This leads to 
the conclusion that democratic stability and endurance is dependent on several factors 
in addition to the regime type. The correlation between the different variables plays an 
active role in determining the probability of democratic survival. Theoretically, one 
cannot stipulate that the parliamentary systems are inherently more conductive to the 
consolidation of democracy or that presidentialism is less favorable a condition to the 
survival of democracy without taking into consideration other parameters or 
independent variables that may interact differently to yield different outcomes (Lipset, 
1990) 
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This theoretical debate was expanded to look at other dependant variables in addition to 
democratic consolidation and regime stability as effects of institutional design and 
regime type. The shift to expand the debate and introduce governance as a dependant 
variable, was first noted when Weaver and Rockman published a paper on what affects 
governance. The study of the impact on institutional design on the performance of 
government should include other variable as indicated by earlier authors studying the 
institutional effects on democratic consolidation. Federalism, electoral rules, and the 
role of the judiciary were variables that needed to be introduced according to Weaver 
and Rockman (Elgie, 2004; Gerring et al, 2009; Weaver & Rockman 1993). 
To summarize then, the theoretical debate over the merits of parliamentarism or 
presidentialism has been ongoing for more than two decades now. Many scholars and 
writers have dedicated volumes to the matter defending one view or the other. The one 
thing that most of those studies agreed on was that institutions do matter, whether to 
democratic consolidation or to governance and policymaking. The other noticeable 
theme is that institutional design in terms of the type of political regime should not be 
regarded in isolation from other independent variables like electoral rules, party system, 
democratic history, political culture and ethno-religious fragmentation. 
 The conclusion that one can draw from the above is that there is not a one-size-fit-all 
solution to the question as to which system is better. The suitability of a particular 
system or the other depends on the unique features of the particular polity in question. 
The fundamental difference between the parliamentary system and the presidential 
system is the degree of separation of powers between the legislature and the executive 
branches. The majority of scholars prefer, on a theoretical level, the consolidation of 
power as opposed to the diffusion of it, which would allow the parliamentary system, 
ceteris paribus, to yield higher probability of democratic survival and better governance 
and policy choices.  
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The section that follows takes off from the theoretical debate to discuss some of the 
main empirical studies that were conducted as part of the discourse in the past decade 
or so  in the attempt to identify the effects of institutional choice and performance on 
specific policy outcomes of democratization, consolidation and stability. 
E m p i r i c a l  S t u d i e s  
A. Governance 
An important empirical study that was published in 2009 dealt with the effect of 
parliamentarism on specific elements of “good governance” (Gerring et al, 2009).  The 
authors analyzed a cross-country data set to test the effects of institutional design in 
terms parliamentarism versus presidentialism on fourteen different dependant variables 
that represent the main policy areas of political, economic, and human development. 
The researchers claim that given the multitude of factors that affect the working of a 
polity, it is not possible in their opinion to present a plausible conceptual schema that 
can infer causality. They offer, however, to reverse the inquiry process by conducting 
the empirical test on the data and then provide an explanatory theory. They base the use 
of this methodology on the premise that when it comes to the working of the 
government it is easier to measure inputs and outputs than to infer a specific causality 
mechanism (Gerring et al, 2009; Persson & Tabellini, 2003). 
In choosing the array of dependant variables that could represent good governance, the 
researchers identified a set of indicators that can be measured and that have an impact 
on the quality of governance. They chose to expand the list of dependant variables to 
cover as many governance indicators as they can reasonable justify improving the 
confidence levels in the results. They divided the dependant variable into three groups: 
political development group, economic development group and human development 
group. Under political development variables, they included two measures of 
corruption, a measure of bureaucratic quality, and three indicators related to 
government effectiveness, political stability and the rule of law. Under the second 
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category, the researchers included a total of five measures of economic development 
namely the number of land telephone lines per 1000 people, imports in the form of 
import duties collected as a percentage of total trade, total trade as a percentage of 
GDP, the country’s risk rating, and the country’s prosperity as measured by the real per 
capita GDP. The third and final category included three measure of human 
development: infant mortality rate, life expectancy and an illiteracy measure (Gerring, 
et al, 2009; Haggard, 2001; Kaufmann et al, 2010) 
For control variable the authors revert to the literature to pick some standard 
independent variables that cover political, geographic, cultural and economic 
conditions in addition to some non standard ones that they include because of their 
possible effect on governance such as a country’s democratic history.  A country’s 
geographic region and proximity to the equator were among the independent variable 
that was introduced. They assigned latitude in absolute terms a logarithmic scale to 
control for economic development, where according to La Porta et al (1999) countries 
away from the equator tend to have better economic development. The resource curse 
or a measure of economic rent was also included although some claim that this could 
have mixed results because while economic rent could hinder good governance, it 
improves economic development, which is conducive to good governance, so the effect 
could be a cancellation out of the impact of this variable.  
Running the regression model, Gerring et al (2009) display some good results on the 
relationship between parliamentarism and the different governance outcomes. t and F 
statistics appear to show a good model fit with    values ranging from 0.47 to 0.9. 
Analysis of the results shows the following:  
Parliamentarism appears to be positively correlated with certain aspects of political 
development but not with the same levels of robustness.  
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In the areas of economic development, parliamentarism seems to be associated with 
better telecommunications infrastructure, better investment rating, higher levels of per 
capita GDP and better openness to trade. 
Areas of human development under study showed positive association with 
parliamentarism in two out of three cases namely infant mortality and life expectancy.  
In summary, it was found that parliamentarism is distinctly advantageous compared to 
presidentialism when it comes to governance in general. Most cases indicated a strong 
positive correlation with good governance as defined by the selected dependant 
variables. The authors conclude that the empirical evidence that was presented in their 
study point to the fact that parliamentary systems of government are more 
advantageous to good governance than presidential systems in most policy areas under 
study, especially economic and human development areas. Gerring et al, (2009) 
proceeded to infer a causality to explain why institutional design affects policy 
outcomes. Drawing on the literature available on the matter, and introducing their own 
analysis, the authors stipulate that parliamentarism is superior to presidentialism for 
better governance because of its capacity as a system to function as coordinating 
agents. Good governance, they argue, is about coordinating efforts for providing 
solutions to multiple, and in most cases, conflicting rationalizations between the 
different groups and the society as a whole. Parliamentarism appears to be better 
equipped to resolve such conflicts because of its inclusive nature, which integrates 
diversity and encourages compromise and agreement (Gerring et al, 2009; Ackerman, 
2001; Eaton, 2000; Hammond et al, 2003; Persson & Tabellini, 2003). 
B. Democratic Stability 
Lawrence (2000) tackled the question of which system is inherently less stable and 
representative, the presidential or the parliamentary system. His approach was to look 
at democracies over a period that started after World War II across the world and use 
quantitative analysis techniques to see the effect of institutional design on stability of 
the regime. In order to control for other variables that have been identified by the 
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scholarship to contribute to the stability of a regime, Lawrence included those variables 
in his model based on nine basic hypothesis derived from the literature on the topic. 
First, he contends that lower income countries tend to have less stable regimes. 
Lawrence used log per capita GDP to control for the country’s economic development 
variable. Second, the connection to the global markets through trade is an important 
factor for regime stability. The relative percentage of exports and imports to a country’s 
GDP is used here as an independent variable. Third, the effective number of parties in 
the parliament is believed to affect the degree of stability of the regime especially in 
presidential systems. Lawrence uses the measure of the effective number of parties 
developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979).  Fourth, Lawrence adds that the states that 
are more homogeneous are more stable than the ones that have greater heterogeneity. 
An indicator of religious fractionalization named ethno-linguistic fractionalization is 
used to operationalize this variable. Fifth, higher population countries tend to be more 
stable than less populated countries. In addition, a history of authoritarian rule will tend 
to make a country less stable according to Lawrence. Finally, the type of regime is 
important for the stability of the democracy which is the main variable under study by 
the article and is used to test for the main hypothesis of his the work and that is regime 
type matters for stability. Stability in that regard is represented by Lawrence as rate of 
regime breakdown as the dependant variable. Running a regression model for hundred 
regimes, and analyzing the results, Lawrence concludes that the results concur with 
Shugart’s and Carey’s argumentation that presidentialism is not inherently unstable as 
was advocated by Linz and others (Lawrence, 2000; Horowitz 1990; Shugart & Carey, 
1992). 
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III. METHODOLGY 
The purpose of this research is to determine the relationship between the institutional 
design in terms of the choice between the presidential and the parliamentary systems of 
government  and indicators of equality, civil liberties and political rights which 
represent the fundamental demands of the Egyptian revolution namely dignity, freedom 
and social justice. The quantitative analysis is conducted using cross-sectional data in a 
multi-variant regression model. The data set is constructed from varied data sources.  
The choice of dependant and independent variables is discussed below. 
V a r i a b l e s  a n d  d a t a  
A. The Dependant Variables 
The dependant variables chosen to represent the fundamental demands of the Egyptian 
people and their code, in parenthesis, in the regression models are: 
1. Gini Coefficient (giniqual) of household income inequality (Deiniger & Squire, 
1996) is a measure of economic inequality in the society and is probably one of the 
most pressing issues of discourse in the Egyptian society presently. In recent 
decades, the rich got richer and the poor got poorer because of poor policy choices, 
corruption and abuse of power by government officials. This makes economic 
inequality the most important dependant variable to be studied here. The data is 
obtained from the World Bank dataset as shown herein after. 
2. Political Rights (polrite) world index is a measure of the degree of political freedom 
in terms of the extent of freedom and fairness of elections. Whether those who are 
elected rule, are there competitive parties, and do the opposition parties have actual 
power and play an important role. Can the minority groups exercise their rights 
freely all on a scale from 1 to 7 with 1 being the highest levels of achievement. 
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3. Civil liberties (civilib) world index from is a 1- 7 index with 1 being the highest 
rating and 7 being the lowest measures freedom of expression, assembly, 
association, education, and religion in a country. Countries with the highest score 
have generally been characterized by an established and equitable system of rule of 
law, economic freedom and values of equal opportunity. 
 
B. The Main Regressor  
The main independent variable is the institutional design feature in terms of the choice 
of presidential or parliamentary systems. That is the main regressor for our study of the 
effect of institutional choice on the welfare of the people of Egypt in general and on the 
essential dependant variables discussed earlier. We use the term parliamentarism 
(parliam) to represent the variable of institutional choice, which is codified as 1 for 
purely parliamentary system of government, in which the legislature is elected by the 
people and it forms the government. In this case, there is no separation of powers when 
it comes to policy making under this system... An example of this system would be the 
Westminster model of government in the United Kingdom. We assign 0 for the other 
systems, which include the semi-presidential system where the executive is the 
president who is directly elected by the people, and there is a head of government and a 
legislator who are also elected by the people. An example of that system would be the 
current Republic of France. In addition, the purely presidential system where 
policymaking is divided between the legislature and the president who are elected 
separately by the people and the example would be the United States system of 
government.  Control variables are included in the model to reduce the bias and 
improve the analysis. The choice of control variables is also based on the attempt to 
simulate the prevailing Egyptian conditions to reflect a closer resemblance to reality. 
 
C. The Control Variables  
1. Electoral rules whether majoritarian, mixed or proportional representation is an 
essential control variable because of its tight correlation with the political regime 
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type. We select two variables out of three to be controlled for and that is 
proportional representation (prorep) and majoritarian/plurality representation 
(majorep) as dummy variables. 
2. Per capita GNP in logarithmic format (LPCGNP) is included as an independent 
variable to control for the economic affluence of the country, source of data is the 
World Development Indicators of the WB.  This control variable was used by 
several researchers in that format based on its effect on the efficacy of governance 
and policymaking (Lawrence, 2000; Gerring et al, 2009, La Porta et al, 1999). 
3. Uncertainty Avoidance Index (ucavoid) is a measure a society's tolerance for 
uncertainty and ambiguity. It reflects the society’s acceptance of others and its 
tolerance of opposing opinions, a basic ingredient of a successful democracy and an 
important cultural control variable. High uncertainty avoiding societies tend to rely 
on rules and regulations and are generally more bureaucratic than countries that 
welcome uncertainty as opportunity for innovation (Hofstede, 2009).  
4. Individualism Index (individ) measures the degree to which individuals are 
integrated into groups. This is another dimension of culture that affects the political 
and policymaking process and hence an important control variable (Haggard & 
Haggard, 2010; Hofstede, 2009).  
5. Power Distance Index (pwrdist):  This is an index that measures the acceptance of 
the people to power being separated and unequally divided. Societies with high 
power distance indices accept that fact that the ruling elite monopolize power.  
(Hofstede, 2009). 
6. Masculinity (mascul) index measures the degree a society in general behaves with 
the masculine traits of assertiveness and competitiveness.(Hofstede, 2009). 
7. Size of the population (popsize) is regarded as an important parameter in the 
stability of the democracy and is therefore included here as a control variable 
(Lawrence, 2000). 
8. Degree of secularism (secular) of the polity represented in a binary format with 1 
representing secular states, where state and church are separated and all citizens are 
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treated equally regardless of their religious or ethnic affiliation, and 0 for all other 
forms. 
9. Adult literacy rate (adlitrcy) is believed to be an important variable to control for 
the education levels and the effects it has on political rights and civil liberties. 
10. The dominant religion in the country (muslim), in terms of the percentage of the 
population, which belong to a particular faith is an important control variable since 
religion plays a very important role in many countries and it is essential to take it 
into account if we are to understand the effects on public policy and individual 
freedoms. 
11. Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is an index that measures the degree of 
corruption in a country based on the perception of people doing business and 
dealing with officials. This index is important to control for since we believe that it 
can affect the inequality index.  
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Table 1- Summary of Variables and Sources 
Variable Description Scale Source 
GINEQUAL Gini 
Inequality 
Index 
0 to 100, 100 is 
perfect 
inequality 
Human Development Report  2010 from UNDP; 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ 
POLIRITE Political 
Rights Index  
1 to7, 1 most 
free, 7 least 
free 
Freedom House world report; 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/press_relea
se/fiw07_charts.pdf 
CIVILIB Civil Liberties 
Index 
1 to7, 1 most 
free, 7 least 
free 
Freedom House world report 
;http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/press_rele
ase/fiw07_charts.pdf 
PARLIAM Political 
System of 
Government 
1 for 
parliamentary 
system, 0 for 
other systems 
CIA  the World Fact Book; 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/xx.html 
PROPREP Electoral 
System  
1 for PR, 0 for 
other 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(IDEA); http://www.idea.int/esd/glossary.cfm 
MAJOREP Electoral 
System  
1 for 
Majoritarian/ 
Plurality, 0 for 
other 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(IDEA), http://www.idea.int/esd/glossary.cfm 
LPOPSIZE Population in 
Log format 
Natural Log in 
1000s 
Human Development Report  2010 from UNDP ; 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ 
ADLITRCY Adult 
Literacy Rate 
Percentage Human Development Report  2010 from UNDP; 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ 
SECULAR Government 
Orientation 
1 for secular, 0 
otherwise 
CIA 's the World Fact book; 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/xx.html 
MUSLIM Predominant 
religion  
1 for Islam, 0 
otherwise 
CIA 's the World Fact book; 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/xx.html 
CPI Corruption 
Perception 
Index 
0 to 10, 10 is 
least corrupt 
Transparency International Report 2010 ; 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surv
eys_indices/cpi/2010/results 
LPCGNP  Annual Per 
Capita Gross 
National 
Product 
 USD in Log 
Format 
  Human Development Report  2010 from UNDP : 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ 
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PWRDIST Power 
Distance 
Index 
0 to 100; high 
numbers 
indicate 
acceptance of 
power distance 
Geert Hofstede Cultural Dimensions; 
http://www.geert-hofstede.com/index.shtml 
INDIVID Individualism 
Index 
0 to 100; high 
numbers 
indicate high 
individualism 
and less 
collectivism 
Geert Hofstede Cultural Dimensions; 
http://www.geert-hofstede.com/index.shtml 
MASCUL Masculinity 
Index 
0 to 100; high 
numbers 
indicate high 
masculinity 
Geert Hofstede Cultural Dimensions; 
http://www.geert-hofstede.com/index.shtml 
UCAVOID Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Index 
0 to 100; high 
numbers 
indicate high 
uncertainty 
avoidance 
affinity 
Geert Hofstede Cultural Dimensions; 
http://www.geert-hofstede.com/index.shtml 
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IV. RESULTS 
T h e  F u l l  M o d e l  
The main regression model used to investigate the relationship between the political 
system and the set of dependant variable of interest can be presented by the functions 
shown below.  
 
 
                                                           
                                                   
                                                     
 
 
                                                          
                                                   
                                                     
 
 
                                                          
                                                   
                                                     
 
 
Due to data limitations and the fact that the main regressor and the most of the control 
variables are dummy variables it was not possible to get meaningful results using panel 
data. We ran a linear multi-variant regression on cross sectional data averaging values 
for Gini coefficients and other parameters over the years 2000 to 2010 and obtained the 
resulting estimates summarized in table 2 below. 
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Table 2- Full Model Estimates 
Variables GINIQUAL POLRITE CIVILIB 
  Coef. t-Ratio Coef. t-Ratio Coef. t-Ratio 
PARLIAM -5.084 -2.857 -0.924 -3.193 -0.648 -3.003 
PROPREP 3.795 1.661 -1.462 -3.877 -1.104 -3.924 
MAJOREP -0.013 -0.005 -0.841 -2.178 -0.597 -2.071 
LPOPSIZE 0.118 0.179 -0.069 -0.727 -0.018 -0.258 
ADLITRCY 0.098 1.028 -0.034 -2.177 -0.031 -2.68 
SECULAR -4.938 -2.287 -0.031 -0.096 -0.087 -0.357 
MUSLIM -4.569 -1.97 1.17 3.157 0.859 3.104 
CPI -0.782 -1.134 -0.238 -2.104 -0.298 -3.538 
PWRDIST 0.034 0.585 0.014 1.404 0.009 1.213 
INDIVID -0.076 -1.326 -0.017 -1.712 -0.018 -2.506 
MASCUL 0.078 1.467 -0.009 -0.973 -0.005 -0.724 
UCAVOID -0.037 -0.794 -0.028 -3.58 -0.02 -3.461 
LPCGNP -0.105 -0.067 0.5 2.03 0.57 3.099 
Obs. 73 82 82 
R-squared 0.508 0.759 0.805 
                                                
 
The above table listing the resulting estimates and t-statistics for the full model shows 
some interesting outcomes. First, R-squared for the three functions indicates good 
model fit. For the inequality index (GINEQUAL), we have an R-squared of 50% and 
several statistically significant independent variables. Our main regressor (PARLIAM) 
representing the political system has a t-ratio of (-2.857) which is significant even at 
99% confidence level in a 1-tailed test and shows a negative effect of about 5% on the 
inequality index. Since the Gini index is scaled from 0 to 100 with perfect inequality at 
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100, a negative effect indicates an improvement in equality direction when a 
parliamentary system is adopted. 
The next statistically significant independent variable at 95% confidence level in a 1-
tailed test is secularism of the state (SECULAR). The data shows that states, which 
have secular governments, have an improved inequality index by about 5%. 
Concurrently, countries with a predominantly Muslim population show a better 
inequality figure by about 4.6%. The remaining control variables do not show statistical 
significance at the specified confidence levels. Electoral rule does fails the significance 
test at 95% confidence level but makes it at 90% and shows that it is positively 
correlated with Gini index which means that PR system of elections is statistically less 
conducive to equality than other systems. 
Observing the political rights (POLRITE) analysis, we note that our main regressor is 
still quite significant and maintains its positive effect on political rights of citizens. The 
coefficient returned is -.924, which means that the parliamentary system improves the 
political rights index by .924 points or 13.2%. Similarly, electoral systems indicators 
show statistical significance at 95% levels and display a negative effect of the political 
rights index meaning a positive effect on political freedom. Proportional representation 
appears to improve the index by 1.462 points or a hefty 20%. Other positive 
contributors to political rights are adult literacy rate (ADLITRCY), the corruption level 
as designated by the corruption perception index (CPI), and the degree of individualism 
in the society (INDIVID), however their effects on political rights although statistically 
significant are not as high as that of the political (PARLIAM) and electoral systems 
(PROREP, MAJOREP). 
An interesting observation to make here is the insignificance of secularism of the 
government, coupled with the high negative effect of a predominantly Muslim 
population on the political freedom of the citizens.  This can be seen from the high t-
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ratio on the (MUSLIM) control variable, which indicates its significance, and its high 
effect on (POLRITE) of 1.17 points or 16.7% increase in the index. 
On civil liberties (CIVILIB), the effects of the independent variables are in line with the 
preceding discussions. While parliamentarism is statistically significant, it has a lesser 
effect than PR electoral system (PROREP). Proportional representation improves the 
civil liberties index by 1.104 points or 15.77 % compared to .648 or 9.25% in the 
parliamentary system case, and .005 points or .07% deterioration as the effect of 
(LPCGNP) on political rights and .0057 points or .08% on civil liberties. The effect of 
the predominance of the Muslim population in a state returns the same significance and 
negative effect on civil liberties as noted in the case of political rights were the index 
deteriorates by .859 points or 12.2%. 
It is clear from the above that we have good fit of variables in the full model and clear 
statistical significance of our main regressor and several of our control variables. The 
association of the dependant variables with the main independent variable and the 
control variables is in line with the initial thesis of the effect of institutional design and 
the choice of the parliamentary system of government given the conditions represented 
by the control variables discussed. In order to test those results for sensitivity and 
robustness we included two additional models. The restricted model and the functional 
form model herein discussed below. 
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T h e  R e s t r i c t e d  M o d e l  
To further test the full model, certain control variables are dropped and the regression 
re-run under the same functional forms to yield the following:   
                                                              
                 
 
                                                             
                 
 
                                                             
                 
 
 
Table 3- Restricted Model Estimates 
Variables GINIQUAL POLRITE CIVILIB 
  Coeff. t-Ratio Coeff. t-Ratio Coeff. t-Ratio 
PARLIAM -4.079 -2.334 -1.015 -3.599 -0.733 -3.341 
ADLITRCY -0.049 -0.819 0.011 1.079 0.007 0.935 
SECULAR -3.796 -2.462 -0.167 -0.673 -0.153 -0.792 
MUSLIM -6.674 -3.609 1.502 5.005 1.124 4.815 
CPI -0.606 -1.093 -0.387 -4.328 -0.386 -5.559 
LPCGNP -0.633 -0.575 -0.133 -0.759 -0.092 -0.676 
Obs. 130 147 147 
R-squared 0.24 0.514 0.566 
 
 
From the above it can be noted that the restrictions have not affected the significance of 
the main independent variable (PARLIAM) with high t-ratios for the three regressions 
on (GINEQUAL), (POLRIT), and (CIVILB). The positive effect of the parliamentary 
system is evident in the three cases with 4.079% improvement in equality, 1.015 points 
or 14.5 % improvement in political rights and .733 points or 10.47% improvement in 
civil liberties compared to other systems of government namely the presidential and 
semi-presidential.  
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Secularism remains significant on equality with a t-ratio of -2.642 and a positive effect 
on equality of 3.76% while it remain insignificant on political rights and civil liberties 
which is similar to the full model. Simultaneously, countries with a predominantly 
Muslim populations show a sustained significance and influence of that variable 
positively on equality by 6.67% and negatively on political rights and civil liberties 
with 21.4% and 16% deterioration respectively. Corruption appears to be more 
significant than in the full model and its effect on equality, political rights and civil 
liberties remain positive in the three cases and in agreement with the full model. The 
one variable that seems to have been affected by the restriction of the model is Log 
(PCGNP), which does not remain significant at 95% confidence levels or lower as 
shown by the t-ratio and the failure to reject the null hypothesis in contrast with the full 
model.  
 
T h e  F u n c t i o n a l  F o r m  M o d e l  
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Table 4- Functional Form Estimates 
Variables GINIQUAL POLRITE CIVILIB 
  Coeff. t-Ratio Coeff. t-Ratio Coeff. t-Ratio 
PARLIAM -4.714 -2.716 -0.954 -3.204 -0.671 -2.963 
PROPREP 3.878 1.777 -1.458 -3.848 -1.093 -3.796 
MAJOREP 0.078 0.032 -0.86 -2.157 -0.609 -2.01 
LPOPSIZE 0.151 0.236 -0.072 -0.751 -0.02 -0.28 
ADLITRCY 0.116 1.259 -0.029 -1.776 -0.026 -2.118 
SECULAR -4.461 -2.07 -0.19 -0.555 -0.208 -0.801 
MUSLIM -3.642 -1.606 1.391 3.659 1.062 3.678 
LCPI -1.558 -0.489 -1.332 -2.456 -1.521 -3.691 
LPWDST 1.532 0.679 0.44 1.089 0.293 0.957 
LINDIVID -3.388 -1.861 -0.267 -0.818 -0.395 -1.593 
LMASC 3.874 2.162 -0.197 -0.616 -0.079 -0.324 
LUCAVOID -1.289 -0.578 -1.276 -3.218 -0.867 -2.879 
LPCGNP -0.765 -0.531 0.349 1.448 0.431 2.357 
Obs. 73 82   82   
R-squared 0.526 0.741 0.783 
 
To further test the model for sensitivity and robustness, the functional forms of the 
appropriate variables are changes as shown in the three model functions above. The full 
model is restored and the variables corruption perception index (CPI), power distance 
(PWDIST), individualism (INDIVID), masculinity (MASCUL), and uncertainty 
avoidance index (UCAVOID), are form changed to log format and the regression re-
run yielding the results listed in table (4). Changing the functional form leaves the main 
regressor robust and resilient displaying very little change in its significance and 
associative effects on the three dependant variables under analysis. Other control 
variables do not appear to be affected greatly by the change in functional form from 
level - level to level-log format. The next test conducted is for the correlation between 
the variables and is shown in table 5 below which shows slight correlation between 
electoral rules proportional representation (PROREP) and majoritarian representation 
(MAJOREP), and between power distance index (PWDIST), individualism (INDIVID) 
and corruption perception index (CPI). 
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C o r r e l a t i o n  M a t r i x  
Table 5- Full Model Pearson Correlations 
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GINIQUAL 1 
            
 
PARLIAM 0.452 1 
           
 
PROPREP 0.128 0.092 1 
          
 
MAJOREP -0.066 -0.124 -0.651 1 
         
 
LPOPSIZE 0.017 -0.188 -0.286 0.192 1 
        
 
ADLITRCY -0.094 0.21 0.219 -0.366 -0.209 1 
       
 
SECULAR -0.388 0.202 0.012 -0.12 0.29 0.413 1 
      
 
MUSLIM -0.06 -0.147 -0.194 0.135 0.089 -0.518 -0.382 1 
     
 
CPI -0.431 0.375 0.196 -0.169 -0.332 0.577 0.4 -0.353 1 
    
 
PWRDIST 0.378 -0.445 -0.203 0.081 0.26 -0.408 -0.282 0.361 -0.69 1 
   
 
INDIVID -0.513 0.374 0.038 -0.032 -0.048 0.42 0.478 -0.177 0.672 -0.659 1 
  
 
MASCUL 0.05 0.107 -0.319 0.055 0.23 0.048 0.018 0.022 -0.11 -0.001 0.099 1 
 
 
UCAVOID 0.211 -0.107 0.314 -0.458 -0.041 0.129 -0.088 -0.099 -0.226 0.221 -0.209 0.096 1 
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V. THE OPTIONS FOR EGYPT 
As shown in the preceding section, parliamentarism appears to be statistically a better 
system of government in terms of its effects on income inequality, political rights and 
civil liberties in the society. The data has shown that the choice of the parliamentary 
system has positive effects on the income inequality index improving it by about 5% 
when compared with other systems of government. One can also infer from the data 
that the parliamentary system is also more conducive to the political rights index and 
the civil liberties index in the countries that adopt that system compared to the countries 
that adopt the presidential or the semi presidential system on a statistical level. How 
does this empirical evidence relate to Egypt in its transitional phase to democracy? Let 
us first apply our estimated econometric functions to Egypt’s case. 
From the full model, we can write the estimated functions as follows: 
                                                     
                                              
                                              
                                         
 
Plugging the current values for Egypt for the regime type being semi presidential, 
electoral process is majoritarian, and the government is non-secular in function (1) 
above yields a GINI Coefficient of 39.15. Now, changing the political regime to 
parliamentary, the government to secular and maintaining the majoritarian or mixed 
electoral system results in an estimated Gini of 29.09 or an improvement of 10.06%. 
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Applying the same procedure on function (2) above for political rights index estimation 
we find that adopting a parliamentary system with proportional representation and a 
secular government could improve Egypt’s standing on political rights as per the PR 
index by 1.57 points or 22 percent.  
 
                                                    
                                           
                                             
                                       
 
Similarly, a choice of a parliamentary system with proportional representation and a 
secular government could improve the estimated civil liberties index by 1.24 points or 
17.7 percent.  
If we are to summarize the above estimations, we conclude that from a statistical point 
of view the adoption of the parliamentary system with proportional representation and 
secularizing the state could yield the following results: 
 An estimated improvement of 10 % on the GINI index of inequality 
 An estimated improvement of 22% on the political rights index 
 An estimated improvement of 17.7 % on the civil liberties index 
 
Should Egypt adopt the parliamentary system as a system of government based on the 
above empirical evidence? Some scholars and political analysts believe not (Shorbagui, 
2011; Shobaki, 2011). Opposition to the parliamentary system in favor of a presidential 
or semi-preseidential systems is based on the following facts, assumptions and 
assertions:  
First, after six decades of authoritarian rule in Egypt, it is difficult to expect existing 
political parties and the new parties, some of which are in the  process of registration, to 
start practicing a full fledged democratic process that requires years of active 
participation. A parliamentary system would require a high level of political maturity 
and established institutions to perform, a fact that many believe is not present in Egypt 
at this time. 
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Second, the many parliamentary, Shoura Council, local centers, and other elections that 
took place in the elapsed decades have been characterized by the predominance of 
tribalism, and fraud. This is viewed as an indication to many that the voters are not yet 
at the required level of democratic maturity that is nessecary for the success of a 
parliamentary system. 
Third, with the current resurgance of the Islamists movements led by the Muslim 
Brothers after the collapse of the old regime in Egypt, and the results of the March 19 
referendum on the constitutional ammendmants and the appeal to the voters’ religious 
orientation by the different political forces campaigning for or against the amendments 
raised concerns about the expected parliamentary elections. Many secularists expect the 
coming parliament to be dominated by those groups, and they fear that a parliamentary 
system would give the Islamists unchecked hegemony over the political life in the 
country.  
Fourth, observers of the Egyptian political scene post the January 2011 revolution note 
that the deteriorating security situation in the country coupled with the persistent fifty 
percent quota for farmers and workers in the parliament would not be conducive 
conditions for electing a representative paliament. The argument here is that such 
unfavorable conditions would result in a parliament that is incapable of legislating and 
governing the country. 
Fifth, some analysts (Nafaa, 2011, Shorbagui, 2011, Shobaki, 2011) advocate the 
concept of sepreation of powers between the executive and the legislature branches of 
government as being a more suitable system for Egypt given its political history and 
cultural heritage. They base their arguments on the fact that Egypt’s history of centuries 
of centralized government headed by a single personal leader supported by a loyal 
bureacracy is strong evidence that thhat is the successful formula especially at critical 
times of transition and turmoil. The troubled Lebanon example is often cited in 
arguments about the suitablity of a parliamentary system to the countries in the region. 
The concern here is that a fragmented parliament would not be able to sustain a 
coalition long enough to steer the country in such difficult times. To many the 
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leadership of a single, strong handed, president with a fairly elected legislature is the 
preffered direction at this point in the history of Egypt. 
Interestingly, it is with that last point that the proponents of the parliamentary system of 
government start their arguments against the presiendtial system for Egypt (Eisaa, 
2011, Hamzawy, 2011, Gad, 2011). The view is that  the presidential system is the 
malaise not the cure. Cultural and political history of the country and the region provide 
no evidence of a successful presidential system that was adopted and did not turn into 
an autocracy. The concepts of checks and balances, seperation of powers, and the 
proper role of the legislature in a presidential republic lack any support in historical 
reality in Egypt and the rest of the Arab countries. The rulers inevitably turn, on their 
own accord or in most cases by the people they rule,  into dictators. In Egypt, 
historically,  presidentialism invariabley  led to authoritarianism.  
Refuting the other arguments presented by proponents of the presiendial system, 
analysts (Ackerman, 2011,Eisaa, 2011, Hamzawy, 2011) believe that the presidential 
system will actually play to the hands of the Muslim Brothers. With their level of 
organization and the religion based popular support, the Brothers will not only control 
the parliament but also the presidency, despite that fact that they have annouced 
repeatedly that they will not have their own nominee. Their suppport to a particluar 
candidate will have a considerable effacy in deciding the next president provided the 
Armed Forces do not intervene. On another level, the concept of a supreme leader is 
fundamental in the Islamists  ideology. The argument that the Egyptian voters are not 
yet “democratically mature” enough to build a successful parliamentary system is 
refuted on two levels. First, maturity comes with practice. Spending additional years 
under a presidential system which may or may not turn into an autocracy will only 
maintain the level of current political apptitude of the voters rather than raise it 
especially if the legislature is dominated by the group that has the keen interest in 
maintaining power. Second, many forget that for a short yet effective period of its 
history, Egypt did have a parliamentary system of government that represented Egypt’s 
golden age of liberalism. The parliamentary system then forced different factions of the 
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society to coalesce for the government of the country and the affirmation of the will of 
the people. Instead of creating a leadership cult, the parliamentary system create a 
leadership coalition (Ackerman, 2011).  
Another important feature of the parliamentary system which is often used against it is 
its lack of stability. The fact the the president cannot be removed from office except 
through impeachment, or a revolution, while a parliamentary government can be 
removed by a vote of no confidence at any time actually should be an argument for and 
not against the parliamentary system. The people will be stuck with an incompetent 
president in a presedential system but will not be stuck with a bad government in a 
parliamentary system. Additionally there is the issue of accountability. Proponents of 
the parliamentary system argue that acoountability is lost in a proper presidential 
system between the legislature and the executive, whereas in a parliamentary system, 
and because the parliament forms the government from its member whether the are the 
majority holders or through coalitions, accountability is consolidated not difused. This 
diffusion of accountability,  among others, was a main problem with the past Egyptian 
regime where the president used the prime minister as a ready scape goat in cases of 
severe popular pressure demanding the performance of government. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this work is to analyze the effects of the choice of the system of 
government on the different important aspects in society. Additionally it is to apply the 
findings to the current situation in Egypt after the January 2011 removal of the regime 
and evaluate the implications given the current political, economic and social 
conditions. Should Egypt retain the current presidential system? Alternatively, should it 
go towards a European style parliamentary system? Our attempt to answer this query 
took us through a conceptualization step followed by a survey of the different 
prominent studies conducted on the topic. The literature is rich with arguments for and 
against either system. We have discussed some of the main arguments about the merits 
and shortcomings of the systems and we included two empirical studies that 
quantitatively analyzed the effects of choice of political regime on the stability and 
survival of the democracy and on several elements of good governance. 
The main effort to find an answer to the pertinent question is the quantitative analysis 
of the effects of the choice of a particular government system on three important 
aspects a society that are chosen to represent the underlying demands of the people of 
Egypt as declared during the January 2011  peaceful revolution. Those aspects are 
income inequality, political rights and civil liberties. We used a multi variant regression 
model on cross sectional data averaging a period of ten years from 2000 to 2010. We 
controlled for other variables that are thought to play a part in the effect on the main 
dependant variables and that are relevant to the Egyptian circumstances. 
Our analysis yielded some interesting results that confirm our initial thesis that the 
parliamentary system has a positive effect on the chosen parameters. The empirical 
results show that parliamentarism, the main independent variable, affects income 
inequality positively, ceteris paribus, with an estimated 5% improvement on the 
inequality measure. The results also show that, statistically, parliamentarism is 
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estimated to improve political rights index and civil liberties index by estimated values 
of up to 15%. Applying the model to the specific case of Egypt, the results are in line 
with the predictions of the general model. 
 After a discussion of the various opinions on the suitability of either system of 
government to Egypt is made and taking into account the results of the empirical 
analysis it is our contention that at this point in its transition to democracy and given the 
historical, cultural, social and political circumstances it appears that Egypt may be 
better off moving towards a parliamentary democracy.  
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